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ABSTRACT 
 Resourcing the wide availability of diving equipment and training, terrorists can 
exploit the sub-surface domain to sabotage naval fleet units, which are prominent state 
assets, when berthed at harbors. An evaluation of the capabilities and limitations related 
to sub-surface domain operations reveals that saboteurs endeavor to minimize physical 
and physiological constraints, domain dynamics, and navigation challenges by operating 
in shallow waters, seeking the advantage of tidal flow effect, and using reference 
navigation whenever possible. Common harbor defense countermeasures are not 
sufficient to thwart such attacks; however, Sri Lankan Navy harbor defenses have 
employed a combination of countermeasures concentrated on saboteur target-seeking 
approaches. The analysis of case studies in this thesis reveals a pattern in target seeking 
for sub-surface saboteur attacks. System dynamic modeling is then used to simulate 
likely saboteur approaches and domain dynamics (tidal dynamics) to determine the 
success or failure of the attack. In the simulation, countermeasure effectiveness is taken 
as the main feedback loop. This thesis recommends that commanding officers of ships 
berthed at harbor can mitigate sub-surface saboteur attacks by implementing technical 
and physical countermeasures based on an understanding of the saboteur’s approach. 
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Conventional naval fleet units stationed at harbors are at great risk from sub-
surface1 saboteur2 attacks from non-state actors, such as terrorists, who are always seeking 
opportunities to catastrophically attack state actors. At the same time, a state's naval fleet 
units must depart from their formations, leaving their collective protection during 
bunkering, fueling, and repairs by calling on various ports and harbors. While deployed 
they must defend themselves with the available resources and the security provided by port 
facilities. On the other hand, ports/harbors are densely populated with various actors and 
operations ashore as well as in the surface and sub-surface domains. In this context, if the 
requisite conditions exist to plan such an attack, terrorists might seek the sub-surface 
domain as the least transparent path to conduct sabotage against naval fleet units berthed 
in harbors. This thesis investigates factors that lead to successful sub-surface saboteur 
attacks, and the means to increase defensive countermeasure effectiveness for naval fleet 
units in harbors. 
A. BACKGROUND 
Terrorists can be assumed to operate around-the-clock, and they are constantly 
seeking targets that will advance their goals. Terrorism is an asymmetric warfare tactic of 
communication and bargaining, and its targets are mostly state actors.3 Through their 
attacks, terrorists hope to coerce the nation under attack while simultaneously enhancing 
their own image with a sympathetic population. Their modus operandi is secretive and 
difficult to predict and detect. Malcolm W. Nance’s Terrorist Recognition Handbook 
 
1 Throughout this thesis sub-surface means the below the sea surface. 
2 Throughout this thesis, I use saboteur and diver interchangeably to describe terrorists whose intention 
is to carryout underwater attacks.  
3 Franklin B. Miles, Asymmetric Warfare: An Historical Perspective (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Army 
War College, 1999), https://apps.dtic.mil/docs/citations/ADA363836. 
2 
provides insights into both terrorism and the  nature of its operations by means of 
asymmetry and various technological means of countermeasures.4 
Terrorists seek the best domain to approach a target undetected. Among the four 
domains (land, air, surface, and sub-surface), the sub-surface domain appears to be the 
most difficult in which to detect a threat, due to the lack of sensor capacity to give reliable 
and timely information to decision makers. Unlike other domains, sub-surface sensors rely 
on sound waves propagating effectively underwater. Hence, sonars in active and passive 
modes are utilized for underwater target detection. In the harbor sub-surface environment, 
however, threat detection is difficult because an attacking swimmer or delivery vehicle 
would generally present a limited cross section and harbors have a high level of ambient 
noise.5  Furthermore, sound wave disturbance, distortion, and reverberation in ports and 
harbors diminish the detection capability.  
Opportunities available for saboteurs include the ready availability of diving 
apparatus, recreational diving networks, and weak harbor defenses. Moreover, safe 
launching points such as adjacent jungles and unmanned areas, sympathetic populations, 
and commercial activities in ports and harbors create opportunities for terrorists to plan an 
underwater saboteur attack. 
B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE PROBLEM 
Terrorists’ exploitation of the sub-surface domain is a threat that decision makers, 
especially the commanding officers of ships, must overcome with the limited port facility 
and shipboard security options available. Hence, it is important to analyze the saboteur’s 
capabilities in juxtaposition to the harbor defenses in order to identify the conditions in 
which terrorists carry out sub-surface sabotage attacks, and to understand what preventive 
measures can be taken to mitigate such attacks. 
 
4 Malcolm W. Nance, Terrorist Recognition Handbook, 2nd ed. (Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press, 2008), 
http://www.crcnetbase.com/isbn/9781420071849. 
5 Zongxin Sun et al., “Experimental Study on Target Characters of Divers,” in Oceans - San Diego, 
2013 (MTS, 2013), 1–5, https://doi.org/10.23919/OCEANS.2013.6741091. 
3 
The question that guides this research is:  What factors are conducive to launching 
a sub-surface saboteur attack against harbor defense measures, and how can ships’ 
commanding officers mitigate sub-surface saboteur threats while berthed in ports/harbors? 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This literature review focuses on research related to historical losses of harbors in 
sub-surface domain attacks and terrorists’ adaptation of World War II (WWII) sub-surface 
sabotage methodologies to attack naval fleet units in harbors. 
During WWII, the Italian Navy imposed significant losses on British ships in the 
Mediterranean by carrying out underwater attacks. They developed manned torpedoes 
operated by two men, and carried out the first successful attack in Gibraltar in September 
1941. Divers managed to affix explosives to the hulls of allied forces’ ships, and these 
attacks resulted in lost tonnage totaling 73,000 gross metric tons (GMT).6 Decades later, 
Argentinian “Montoneros” guerillas adopted and exploited these subsurface attacks to sink 
an Argentinian navy destroyer in the Rio Santiago Shipyard by carrying out an underwater 
mine attack.7 This was the first confirmed post-WWII sub-surface terrorist attack.8  They 
later mined a yacht belonging to the commander in chief of the Argentinian Navy.9 
Nineteen years later, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Ealam (LTTE) began using underwater 
sabotage against Sri Lanka Navy (SLN) fleet units. During the period of 1994–1996 and 
2008, the LTTE was successful in penetrating SLN harbor defenses and conducting 
sabotage attacks. Unlike the Alexandria or Rio Santiago attacks, all LTTE underwater 
attacks were conducted by suicide divers, and the success of each attack meant there would 
be no interrogation of the saboteurs. The SLN lost nine of its ships and craft.10   
 
6 William H. McRaven, Spec Ops: Case Studies in Special Operations Warfare: Theory and Practice 
(New York: Random House Publishing Group, 2009), 73–114. 
7 Rupert Herbert-Burns, Sam Bateman, and Peter Lehr, Lloyd’s MIU Handbook of Maritime Security 
(Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press, 2008), 62. 
8 Herbert-Burns, Bateman, and Lehr, 62. 
9 Herbert-Burns, Bateman, and Lehr, 63. 
10 Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka. Ministry of Defence, Humanitarian Operations: 
Factual Analysis July 2006- May 2009 (Colombo: Ministry of Defence, 2011), http://slembassyusa.org/wp-
content/uploads/2011/08/Sri-Lankan-Humanitarian-Operation-Factual-Analysis.pdf. 
4 
Following the terrorist attacks of 9/11, America’s efforts to counter non-state 
actors’ asymmetric warfare included precautionary measures against such operations in the 
maritime domain. As a result, the International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) code 
came into effect under the umbrella of the International Maritime Organization (IMO) to 
protect shipping, ports, and harbors from impending attacks. The ISPS’s main purpose is 
to encourage the active involvement of port authorities and the shipping industry in 
collectively defending against asymmetric threats to maritime interests. The ISPS defines 
awareness, training, rehearsals, and drills for security officials covering a variety of 
situations.11 
Maritime domain awareness has become an area of study and practical 
implementation intended to inform the protection of ports/harbors and to secure sea lines 
of communication from maritime terrorism and other threats.12 These threats include 
terrorism, piracy, illicit trafficking, hijacking, state-on-state conflict, and sabotage attacks 
among others. Among identified maritime terrorist groups are the LTTE in Sri Lanka, Abu 
Sayyaf in the Philippines, Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas in Palestine, and Al Qaeda 
activities globally in the maritime domain. Sam Bateman’s research addresses threat 
assessment, terrorist capabilities, threats to ships, and possible attack scenarios in 
harbors.13 He highlights the LTTE and its attack model against Sri Lanka Navy fleet units 
as well as “Al-Qaeda and its associated groups such as Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), Abu Sayyaf 
Group (ASG).”14  
The Naval Research Center in Constanta, Romania, addressed the diversity of 
terrorist threats in harbors and the sub-surface domain’s vulnerability as a medium of 
 
11 International Maritime Organization, Security Awareness Training for All Port Facility Personnel 
(London: IMO Publishing, 2011). 
12 Paul Shemella, Global Responses to Maritime Violence: Cooperation and Collective Action 
(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2016). 
13 Sam Bateman, “Assessing the Threat of Maritime Terrorism: Issues for the Asia-Pacific Region,” 
Security Challenges 2, no. 3 (2006): 77–91. 
14 Bateman, “Assessing the Threat of Maritime Terrorism.” 
5 
insertion for a saboteur attack.15 This research found the potential success of a diver as an 
attacker/weapon was favorable in terms of availability, probability of detection, and 
destructive potential when compared with a torpedo, small craft, mine, autonomous 
underwater vehicle/remotely operated vehicle (AUV/ROV), or mini submarine. With 
regard to the likelihood of detection by sonar, a diver presents a significantly lower target 
strength and noise level, and it is therefore impossible to achieve a 100% effective harbor 
defense system or a single universal defensive countermeasure for ports and harbor 
protection against underwater saboteurs. This research is primarily focused on 
technological aspects of divers in harbors: aspects of diver approaches to, and target 
seeking of naval fleet units in harbors. A crucial finding is that the ability of a saboteur 
diver to evade and penetrate physical harbor defense barriers, compared with an unmanned 
vehicle or device, further increases the vulnerability of fleet units in harbors. 
That being the case, there are a variety of constraints and limitations that a saboteur 
must overcome to plan and execute a successful underwater saboteur attack, which the 
subsequent chapters of this thesis analyzes in depth. Since there are limitations for both 
offensive and defensive operations, it is necessary to analyze what an underwater saboteur 
would require to plan and conduct a successful attack if effective countermeasures are to 
be developed.  
D. METHODOLOGY 
This thesis applies an exploratory research approach that employs qualitative case 
study analysis based on six sub-surface saboteur attacks conducted in harbors, including 
those of the LTTE Sea Tigers against Sri Lankan Navy fleet units during the civil war in 
Sri Lanka.16 System dynamics modeling that incorporates both qualitative and quantitative 
data was used to gain further insight into various feedback mechanisms that contribute to 
the overall behavior of a countermeasures system to thwart or deter underwater terrorist 
attacks against conventional fleet units in harbors. 
 
15 Ovidiu Radu et al., Harbor Protection Against Terrorist Threats: Difficulties and Possible Solutions 
(Constanta, Romania: Naval Research Center, n.d.), https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a485049.pdf. 
16 Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka. Ministry of Defence, Humanitarian Operations. 
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E. THESIS OVERVIEW 
Chapter I of this thesis has presented the problem of terrorists exploiting the sub-
surface domain to attack naval fleet units while in ports and harbors. Chapter II analyzes 
the capabilities and limitations of sub-surface saboteurs. Chapter III discusses the 
capabilities and limitations of countermeasures used in harbor defenses, and the 
effectiveness of increasing countermeasures focusing on the SLN’s experiences with LTTE 
suicide divers. Chapter IV discusses and examines six case studies that address factors that 
lead to the success or failure of a sub-surface attack in harbors. Chapter V models the 
factors that lead to successful or failed attacks, using System Dynamic (SD) modeling that 
takes “countermeasure effectiveness” as the main feedback loop in the system. Finally, 
Chapter VI makes some recommendations for ships’ commanding officers to increase 
countermeasure effectiveness and vigilance when naval fleet units are berthed in harbors. 
7 
II. CAPABILITY AND LIMITATION ANALYSIS  
OF SABOTEURS 
The ability of terrorists to successfully plan and execute a sub-surface sabotage 
attack depends on their acquisition of diving equipment and dive training, and the 
feasibility of penetrating the harbor environment and homing to the target in the sub-
surface domain. The rapid development of the commercial, military, and recreational 
diving industries has created an opportunity for an individual to acquire the requisite diving 
equipment and training to plan a sub-surface attack. Since commercial diving operations 
generally do not demand much underwater spatial mobility,17 military and recreational 
diving operations better develop skills related to the stamina and the endurance needed to 
conduct a sub-surface attack.  
There are a number of factors, however, that limit serious consideration of 
underwater terrorist sabotage, such as the physical and physiological constraints, domain 
dynamics, underwater navigation, and target-seeking methods that impede evasion of 
detection by harbor defense countermeasures. This chapter describes and assesses the 
capabilities and limitations unique to underwater terrorist operations in harbor 
environments.  
A. RECREATIONAL DIVING INDUSTRY AS A MEANS OF RESOURCE 
ACQUISITION 
Today, sub-surface domain operational planning has more resources at hand due to 
the wide availability of recreational diving equipment throughout the world. Scuba gear 
produced by various diving equipment manufacturing companies provides an individual 
great mobility in the sub-surface domain. This includes open-circuit scuba, where the 
exhaust is vented directly to the surrounding water; closed-circuit scuba (rebreather 
 
17 Hal Lomax, The Commercial Diver’s Handbook: Surface-Supplied Diving, Decompression and 
Chamber Operations Field Guide (North Palm Beach, FL: Best Publishing Company, 2013). 
8 
diving), where the oxygen is filtered and recirculated; and semi-closed circuit scuba, which 
combines features of the open- and closed-circuit systems.18  
Furthermore, dive center networks offer technology and specialty training that 
facilitate recreational diving anywhere in the world.19 The Professional Association of 
Diving Instructors (PADI) is the largest global recreational diver training and facility 
network. The Scuba Schools International (SSI), Rebreather Association of International 
Divers (RID), and the British Aqua Club are other significant diving associations that 
provide diver training and access to equipment. Normally, recreational dive training starts 
with a basic-level open-circuit Scuba apparatus. Specialty trainings cater to divers who 
want to learn mixed-gas diving or rebreather diving to enhance their depth capabilities and 
endurance.20 
The worldwide availability of recreational dive training enables greater underwater 
mobility and endurance. This training and these skills could be used by individuals seeking 
to carry out terrorist or saboteur attacks. 
Additionally, many national navies provide diving and underwater training, 
including underwater explosives handling. This training is accessible for terrorists who 
seek to specialize in sub-surface saboteur attacks. For example, Montonero guerrillas in 
Argentina managed to obtain diving technology training from ex-Italian Decima MAS 
frogmen,21 and the LTTE in Sri Lanka managed to obtain training in underwater 
demolition given by ex-Norwegian special forces members in the Andaman Sea.22 
 
 
18 Naval Sea Systems Command, U.S. Diving Manual, 7 Rev., SS521-AG-PRO-010 (Washington, DC: 
U.S. Government Printing Office, 2016), 
https://www.navsea.navy.mil/Portals/103/Documents/SUPSALV/Diving/US%20DIVING%20MANUAL_
REV7.pdf?ver=2017-01-11-102354-393. 
19 “Scuba Certification Agencies,” Aquaviews (blog), November 2, 2018, 
https://www.leisurepro.com/blog/scuba-guides/scuba-certification-agencies-padi-naui-bsac-cmas-and-
more/. 
20 “Technical Diving Course Offerings,” PADI, accessed June 23, 2019, 
https://www.padi.com/technical-courses. 
21 Nigel West, Historical Dictionary of Naval Intelligence (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 
2010), 210. 
22 Herbert-Burns, Bateman, and Lehr, Lloyd’s MIU Handbook of Maritime Security, 64. 
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B. PHYSICAL AND PHYSIOLOGICAL CONSTRAINTS OF THE SUB-
SURFACE DOMAIN 
Unlike in other domains, a person operating in the sub-surface domain is exposed 
to elevated atmospheric pressures causing physical and physiological constraints. For this 
reason, most diving manuals begin with the physics and the physiology of diving. These 
instructions clarify the parameters and constraints that exist in the sub-surface domain. 
Usually, sub-surface saboteurs avoid deeper depths to minimize physical and physiological 
constraints when approaching targets. 
1. Physical Constraints 
Underwater diving physics focuses on the many environmental aspects of diving, 
such as energy, atmospheric pressure, gases, and buoyancy.23 Pressure variance with depth 
is an important phenomenon that directly affects the human body.24  
Atmospheric pressure is equal to 33 feet of sea water (fsw), such that every 33 feet 
of depth places 1 atmosphere absolute (ata) of pressure on the diver. Pressure is 
proportionate to volume, according to Boyles law,25 and the pressure and volume 
relationship underwater is depicted in Figure 1. This pressure variance affects human body 
cavities such as the lungs, sinuses, and external ear canal. Also, the volume of required 
breathing gas increases with diving depth.  
 
23 Naval Sea Systems Command, U.S. Diving Manual, 2–1. 
24 Naval Sea Systems Command, 3–23. 
25 Naval Sea Systems Command, 2–17. 
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Figure 1. Pressure volume relationship underwater.26 
2. Physiological Constraints 
Diving physiology addresses the exposure of pressure on the human body and its 
effects on divers.27 Humans usually breathe 78.08% nitrogen, 20.95% oxygen, and 0.03% 
carbon dioxide at 1 ata. As such, the human body is accustomed to function under partial 
pressures (pp) of 0.7808 ata of nitrogen, 0.2095 ata of oxygen, and 0.0003 ata of carbon 
dioxide.28 When divers are exposed to higher pressures as they dive deeper, they breathe 
gases with higher partial pressures, resulting in more gases entering the blood stream.  
There are thresholds for partial pressures of breathing gases that the human body 
can withstand, and divers who exceed those thresholds may succumb to diving-induced 
maladies.29 The partial pressures of the breathing gas depends on the diving depth and the 
gas mixture in the diving equipment. As an example, a diver who breathes higher partial 
 
26 “Pressure & Diving,” Scuba Tutor, accessed August 13, 2019, http://www.scuba-tutor.com/dive-
physics/pressure/. 
27 Naval Sea Systems Command, U.S. Diving Manual, 3–1. 
28 Naval Sea Systems Command, 2–24. 
29 Naval Sea Systems Command, 3–40. 
  
11 
pressure oxygen succumbs to oxygen toxicity,30 and a diver who breathes higher partial 
pressure nitrogen succumbs to nitrogen narcosis.31 
3. Probable Depth of Sub-surface Approach 
Divers carrying out saboteur attacks prefer shallow depths for three reasons. First, 
they do not want to waste available gas by diving deep. Second, they do not want to 
succumb to diving disorders associated with deeper depth. Third, they want to be able to 
come up to the surface for direction corrections, as there is no precise navigation system 
that works underwater. Hence, physical and physiological constraints are not necessarily 
limiting factors unless a diver chooses a route involving deeper depths to avoid detection 
by harbor defenses. 
C. SPEED AND UNDERWATER ENDURANCE 
Respiratory Minute Volume (RMV), which is the total volume of air in and out of 
the lungs per minute,32 determines the underwater endurance of a diver. Underwater 
endurance depends on the RMV and oxygen consumption of the human body as well as 
the physical exertion required by underwater working conditions, as depicted in Figure 2.33 
 
30 Naval Sea Systems Command, 3–42. 
31 Naval Sea Systems Command, 3–40. 
32 Naval Sea Systems Command, 3–9. 
33 Naval Sea Systems Command, 3–12. 
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Figure 2. Oxygen consumption and RMV at different work rates.34 
Accordingly, if a diver’s underwater swimming speed is 0.85 knots (1 knot = 1,852 
meters), which is the typical “moderate work” rate performance, the diver expends 30 liters 
of gas RMV irrespective of depth. Therefore, a diver’s endurance depends on the type of 
equipment and operating depth. Usually a saboteur using open-circuit Scuba equipment 
spends less time underwater due to exhalation air released to the surrounding water 
according to the RMV, while closed-circuit scuba equipment allows the diver to rebreathe 
the air according to the oxygen consumption rate.35 The operating range of a saboteur 
depends on the time and the speed achievable underwater either by fins or speed 
augmenting methods.  
Diver Propulsion Vehicles (DPV) or “sea scooters” can be used to augment a 
diver’s swim speed, saving energy and air. DPV underwater speeds range between 1.7 
 
34 Naval Sea Systems Command, 3–12. 
35 Naval Sea Systems Command, 3–11. 
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knots (2 mph) to 3.9 knots (4.5 mph).36 On the other hand, carrying a sufficient supply of 
explosives negatively affects the diver’s speed and endurance. 
D. DYNAMICS OF THE HARBOR SUB-SURFACE DOMAIN 
The harbor environment presents many challenges that a sub-surface saboteur must 
overcome. Harbors are geographically different from one another. Some harbors are bays 
with narrow openings to the high seas, while some are constructed using break waters 
where water enters and leaves through the opening due to tide changes. This study focuses 
on harbors affected by the tide. Tidal difference is a natural phenomenon that occurs 
approximately every six hours and creates sinusoidal rising and falling of the seawater 
level.37 This allows water to enter the harbor basin through the harbor mouth and vice 
versa, resulting in dynamic behavior. 
Tidal flow is often the most disruptive external force that acts upon a diver, 
displacing the diver from his or her desired course. The intensity of the dynamic behavior 
differs from harbor to harbor based on the tidal difference, basin volume, and area of the 
harbor mouth. Maritime charts and tide tables onboard ships are readily available guides 
that anyone can use to understand and determine sub-surface domain dynamics. 
1. Basin Volume, Harbor Mouth, and Tidal Flow 
The depth profile of a particular harbor relates to how much water volume is 
available in the harbor basin, which is determined by the surface area and depth of the 
harbor basin. The flooding (inflow) and ebbing (outflow) tides pass through the harbor 
mouth. When the basin volume is large and the harbor mouth is small, there will be a 
significant flow of water that floods and ebbs from the harbor basin through the harbor 
mouth, exerting a significant tidal flow effect on divers. Hence, the tidal flow effect is a 
function of basin volume, area of harbor mouth, and tidal difference. 
 
36 Jennie Doyle, “Best Sea Scooter Reviews - Consumer Reports,” Popular Reviews, September 11, 
2019, https://popular.reviews/sea-scooter/. 
37 Matt Rosenberg, “Tides - What Creates Them and Determines Their Timing: The Sun and Moon 
Affect the Oceans Tides,” ThoughtCo, August 1, 2018, https://www.thoughtco.com/what-are-tides-
1435357. 
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2. Tidal Flow Effect 
The periodicity of the tidal flow effect is also sinusoidal. When the tide is in a rising 
state, the harbor starts flooding and flow maximizes at the third hour then gradually 
decreases to zero when it reaches the high tide level at the sixth hour. Tidal flow then starts 
reciprocating, with water leaving the harbor at the ebbing tide. The magnitude of the 
sinusoidal tidal flow effect on the diver varies based on the diver’s place in the sub–surface 
domain in the harbor topography. Tidal flow effect in the sub-surface domain can 
accelerate, decelerate, or offset the diver’s direct approach to the target. The angle of tidal 
flow effect can act against divers, causing them to deviate from their desired course of 
navigation. Therefore, the vector of a diver’s approach is a combination of swimming speed 
and tidal flow effect.  
3. Pier Location Relative to the Tidal Flow 
Piers in harbors are structures subjected to the same tidal flow effect. Depending 
on the pier’s placement within the harbor, however, the severity of the effect may vary 
based on the angle of the tidal flow. Hence the naval fleet unit berthed in a harbor 
experiences the sinusoidal tidal flow effect of wave length and amplitude dependent upon 
the relative location of the pier. Therefore, tidal flow relative to the pier location may 
determine the place of insertion or the direction of approach for a saboteur attack.  
E. UNDERWATER NAVIGATION AND TARGET SEEKING 
Navigation is the next challenge a diver faces in the sub-surface harbor 
environment. Recreational dive training provides two basic methods of navigation: natural 
navigation and compass navigation.38 Natural navigation requires the diver to fix his or 
her position using the available references on the sea floor or by using other natural 
references such as the sun, current flow, etc. Compass navigation allows the diver to 
navigate point to point using a magnetic compass. Since global positioning system (GPS) 
 
38 “Underwater Navigator,” in Adventures in Diving (Rancho Santa Margarita, CA: PADI), 263–86, 
accessed June 24, 2019, http://www.scubabrucediving.com/Scuba_Bruce_Diving_-
_Forms/PDF__Files/Navigator.pdf. 
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signals do not penetrate underwater, compass navigation has been the most accurate form 
of navigation available to the diver. Technology, however, continues to advance the tools 
utilized in dive operations. Today, devices are commercially available that allow divers to 
receive their GPS coordinates from a buoy that downlinks the GPS signal to a buoy-
mounted receiver that provides range and distance from the diver on a wearable wrist 
device. Although GPS signals will not penetrate the water’s surface, this is a new 
technology that a saboteur could employ. It should be noted, however, that the presence of 
the buoy would make the saboteur vulnerable to detection.39  
A saboteur who approaches a target while evading harbor defense countermeasures 
must navigate using one of the following methods: reference navigation (RN), where the 
diver uses underwater reference features; two-dimensional (2D) navigation, where the 
diver navigates in a 2D plane using a compass and touching the bottom of the sea floor; or, 
three-dimensional (3D) navigation where the diver navigates in the 3D plane using a 
compass and a depth gauge to maintain depth. In each case, the diver needs to overcome 
sub-surface dynamics inherent in the water column of the harbor environment. Beyond 
harbor countermeasures, understanding the harbor domain dynamics is crucial in 
anticipating how a sub-surface saboteur will navigate to and approach the target. 
Depending on the time of the day, the distance that must be covered, and the tidal force in 
the harbor, the saboteur might adjust his or her methods of navigation and approach. 
1. Reference Navigation  
Using this navigation method, a saboteur seeks the target using underwater 
references such as piers, break waters, and features of the sea floor. Reference navigation 
allows a saboteur to map underwater features, possibly through rehearsals, for navigating 
to the pier at which the naval fleet unit might be berthed. Saboteurs use this kind of 
navigation to compensate for sub-surface domain dynamics without the use of a compass 
 
39 “Navimate GPS for Divers,” Navimate, accessed November 8, 2019, https://www.navimate.com; 
“Navigator: Diver Held Sonar Imaging and Navigation System,” Shark Marine Technologies Inc., accessed 
November 8, 2019, http://www.sharkmarine.com/products/diver-held-systems/navigator/. 
16 
to carry their course. The pier topography and sea floor provide reference points for this 
navigation method.  
2. 2D Navigation 
In some situations, evading countermeasures forces divers to swim under water 
where reference navigation features are not available. In such conditions, divers may 
reference the sea floor and use a magnetic compass to home to the target. Harbors with 
shallow and medium depths and sandy bottoms are favorable for this method of navigation. 
The accuracy of the diver’s navigation is influenced by both the external force exerted on 
the diver by the water column and the symmetric power created by fins or other propulsion 
methods. Both factors offset the diver from his or her route, resulting in the diver needing 
to surface for course corrections. When the distance to the target increases, the offset 
increases and more corrections are necessary to maintain the intended course.  
3. 3D Navigation 
3D navigation is necessary when operating in deep harbors, especially when 
crossing harbor mouths and channels to reach the target. This is a very difficult approach 
because the diver has to observe both his or her depth gauge and compass to maintain the 
course to the target. Because of the increase in needed course corrections, and because the 
diver might encounter more constraints and offset, 3D navigation is the least preferred 
method of navigation. To overcome these constraints, saboteurs will often swim on the 
surface until they find conditions for 2D or reference navigation. 
F. CONCLUSION 
Sub-surface attack success depends on equipment acquisition, dive training, surface 
insertion close to the target, and navigating to the target while minimizing domain 
constraints and avoiding harbor defense countermeasures. Ready availability of 
recreational diving networks provides sufficient capacity to plan an underwater attack. 
Saboteurs in the sub-surface domain have to minimize physical and physiological 
constraints, however, and have to face domain dynamics unique to the harbor while 
evading the countermeasures of harbor defenses to successfully execute an attack. 
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Saboteurs use shallow depths to avoid physiological constraints and to make course 
corrections in homing to the target. To overcome the deviations from the desired course 
due to the domain dynamics, the saboteur prefers reference navigation. Since negative 
domain dynamics distance the saboteur from the target and timely execution, seeking 
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III. HARBOR DEFENSE COUNTERMEASURE CAPABILITY 
AND LIMITATIONS ANALYSIS 
Common harbor defenses include various physical and technological 
countermeasures intended to protect the harbors from impending attacks. Harbor defenses 
typically include three domains: land, water surface, and sub-surface. Since detecting, 
distinguishing, and localizing saboteurs in the sub-surface domain is extremely difficult, 
harbor defenses that counter saboteurs during the preparation and insertion phases (in the 
land and surface domains) may be most effective in mitigating sub-surface attacks. When 
these defenses fail, however, and a saboteur is able to exploit the sub-surface domain, there 
are several countermeasures available to harbor defenses to thwart sub-surface attacks. 
This chapter describes and evaluates both sub-surface and surface countermeasures that 
can work in concert to achieve defense-in-depth to mitigate sub-surface saboteur attacks, 
and an illustration of these harbor defense countermeasures may be seen by examining the 
SLN’s experiences. 
Today, harbor defenses depend mainly upon sonar’s ability to detect sub-surface 
saboteurs. But relying solely on this technology creates gaps and limitations that sub-
surface saboteurs can exploit to successfully attack ships berthed in harbor. High-frequency 
multi-beam sonars in the mid-1990s emerged as the most successful technological 
invention to detect divers.40 The optimal sonar frequency range for diver detection is 
between 85 and 100 kHertz. Nonetheless, diver detection sonars have a variety of ranges 
and detection capabilities for a spectrum of hydrographic conditions. Diver detection sonar 
companies are producing active and passive sonar systems with an average detection range 
of 700 meters,41 but the degree of effectiveness depends on whether the harbor 
environment is conducive to the manufacturers’ set conditions, such as operating 
frequency, transmitting angle, beam width, transducer depth/location, target character 
(open-circuit, closed-circuit, DPV, etc.), and active and passive modes of operations.  
 
40 Paolo Valpolini, “Harbours Keeping Harm at Bay,” Armada International 35, no. 4 (2011): 14–20. 
41 Valpolini, “Harbours Keeping Harm at Bay.” 
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Passive sonar systems, such as hydrophones, are capable of detecting a diver’s 
inhalation and exhalation regardless of whether he is using an open- or closed-circuit diving 
apparatus. The range of passive sonar systems, however, is limited to about 50 meters and, 
given the amount of ambient noise in the harbor environment, this may be insufficient for 
distinguishing a sub-surface saboteur from other ambient noise (sounds). Therefore, even 
though sonar is the detection method on which most harbors rely, it should be used in 
combination with several other countermeasures to achieve effective defense-in-depth.  
Sri Lankan Navy harbor defenses were successful in countering LTTE sub-surface 
saboteur attacks from 1996 to 2008 by combining several countermeasures to protect naval 
piers. The attack in 2008 shows how saboteurs sought the advantage of exploiting and 
evading weaker harbor defenses at a commercial pier. After describing and evaluating each 
countermeasure, this chapter explains how the SLN employed each countermeasure and to 
what extent the countermeasure was effective for detecting, distinguishing, and localizing 
saboteurs.  
A. COUNTERMEASURES AGAINST SUB-SURFACE SABOTEURS IN  
SRI LANKAN HARBORS 
The Sri Lankan Navy applied several countermeasures against sub-surface 
saboteurs based on its understanding of the divers’ probable insertion points and 
approaches into the harbor environment. Firstly, the land domain was dominated by ground 
troops to prevent saboteurs from inserting into the sub-surface domain at close range, and 
intelligence operatives supported the identification of potential saboteurs. Secondly, the 
SLN strengthened perimeter security in and around the harbors, implementing boat patrols, 
radars, day cameras, and thermal imaging cameras to monitor the surface domain activities. 
Furthermore, the SLN randomly threw scare charges (made of gelignite) to deter and 
neutralize saboteurs, with more charges being deployed in closer proximity to naval fleet 
units. Thirdly, sub-surface domain countermeasures included physical barriers and diver-
detection, fish-finder sonars, and hydrophones.  
Sub-surface domain countermeasure effectiveness was based on the ability to 
detect, distinguish, and localize saboteurs. In an effort to avoid detection, saboteurs may 
21 
use reference navigation to approach a target along the piers. Therefore, to protect ships 
that are pier-side, it is important to employ countermeasures that can specifically thwart 
divers underwater.  
After the surge of attacks against ships berthed in harbors between 1994 and 1996, 
the SLN improved its countermeasures that concentrated on naval piers. It also regularly 
ran exercises to test and improve countermeasures, covering all possible means of approach 
by LTTE suicide divers. The aim was to achieve defense-in-depth to obstruct a saboteur’s 
approach at any phase. 
1. Patrol Boats 
Patrol Boats are effective in harbors for observing unusual behavior of surface 
swimmers and vessels, but they are very ineffective against sub-surface swimmers or 
swimmer delivery vehicles. In the context of SLN harbor defenses, dinghy boats were 
deployed with trained personnel carrying small arms, sufficient scare charges, and search 
lights to deter saboteurs entering and swimming in the sub-surface domain, as well as those 
who must come up to the surface to make navigational course corrections. Patrol boats can 
then localize saboteurs once they have been detected.  
2. Radars 
Doppler radars determine target range by analyzing reflected waves generated from 
transmitted high-frequency electromagnetic pulses. Depending on their power, 
transmission frequency, and location radars can be moderately effective for detecting 
surface swimmers in calm sea conditions, such as harbors. If the saboteurs are surface 
swimming in a cluster, radar paints quite a strong echo. A radar may pick up a return from 
even a single saboteur swimming on the surface prior to diving. The SLN has regularly 
conducted training for radar operators to identify weak echoes by deploying surface 
swimmers in different wave conditions.  
3. Thermal Imaging Camera Systems 
Thermal imaging cameras that discriminate thermal signatures from ambient heat 
are effective for detecting surface swimmers. These cameras are especially useful at night, 
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which is when saboteurs prefer to launch attacks. Unlike the possibilities of false echoes in 
radar, thermal imaging can distinguish saboteurs in the surface domain from other marine 
mammals or floating objects. The SLN has effectively employed thermal imaging camera 
systems to surveil harbor mouths and possible approach paths.  
4. Diver Detection Sonars 
As discussed in the introduction of this chapter, diver detection sonars can be 
effective at detecting saboteurs in the sub-surface domain. The SLN employs a variety of 
affordable sonar systems in Sri Lankan harbors, including fish-finder sonars employed in 
both boat-mounted mobile platforms and stationary platforms. The SLN also utilizes 
hydrophones as passive sonars at harbor entrances and areas that saboteurs could use as 
sub-surface references to navigate to their targets, such as edges of piers.  
5. Physical Barriers 
The SLN also maintains chain-link net barriers within harbor areas, anchored with 
sinkers at the bottom and floaters at the top, to create a shield against attack. Maintaining 
the barriers requires many man hours since the shield periodically collapses under rapid 
barnacle growth and waves created by wind and wake action. Moreover, the effectiveness 
of these barriers is reduced as saboteurs become aware of, and exploit, existing gaps or 
when they create gaps using wire cutters. Also, the presence of a physical barrier can act 
as a reference point indicating to the diver that he has reached the area of interest. 
On the other hand, the SLN has identified fishing nets as an affordable 
countermeasure. Under water, divers become entangled in the fishing net, thereby 
revealing their presence through the erratic movement of the floatation devices on the 
surface. This allows patrol boats to detect and localize the source of the movement. The 
SLN has also recruited fishermen to put this countermeasure in place effectively. 
6. Scare Charges 
Scare charges are the most effective countermeasure the SLN has used to deter sub-
surface saboteurs. The charges can generate harmful sound waves that inflict excessive 
pressure on divers, potentially rendering them unconscious or killing them. Sound waves 
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that generate 50 psig can force divers out of the water, while pressures of 500 psig will 
cause certain death.42  It is not practical to use scare charges in harbors continuously, 
however, because they may damage existing harbor defense sonars, especially 
hydrophones, and are harmful to the marine habitat.  
B. CONCLUSION 
Harbor defenses can employ both physical and technological countermeasures to 
mitigate sub-surface attacks. Although many harbors rely heavily on sonar devices, the 
SLN cases illustrate that effectively defending the harbor environment requires 
implementing a combination of countermeasures to detect, distinguish, localize, and 
neutralize sub-surface saboteurs. Combining patrol boats, radars, thermal imaging, diver 
detection sonars, physical barriers, and scare charges, as well as persistently training 
personnel to use or monitor all of these countermeasures effectively, can provide the 
defense in depth required to mitigate sub-surface saboteur attacks. Not all harbors have the 
capability or resources to achieve this level of defense in depth, however, especially as it 
pertains to the sub-surface domain. For that reason, commanding officers must employ 
their own countermeasures to protect individual ships berthed in harbors. 
  
 
42 Jay McCullough, ed., Ultimate Guide to U.S. Special Forces Skills, Tactics, and Techniques (New 
York: Skyhorse Publishing, 2011), Chaps. 10–13. 
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IV. CASE STUDY ANALYSIS AND BOUNDARIES OF  
SUB-SURFACE DOMAIN ATTACKS IN HARBORS 
The following six case studies—two attacks in Alexandria Harbor, one attack in the 
Rio Santiago Shipyard, two attacks in Kankasanthurei Harbor, one attack in Karainagar 
Pier, three attacks in Trincomalee Harbor, and one attack in Colombo Harbor—identify the 
correlative and causal factors that lead to both successful and failed attacks in the sub-
surface domain.  
A. BACKGROUND TO THE CASE STUDIES 
Since all successful sub-surface domain saboteur attacks were conducted during 
dark hours, there is a strong correlation between darkness and attack success. The distance 
to the target is another important variable for attack success, and saboteurs attempt to 
minimize this distance by approaching closer to the target by surface means. Also, 
saboteurs successfully attacked in less disturbed sub-surface domains which minimized 
domain dynamics and navigation challenges. Furthermore, these case studies analyze 
successful and failed attacks in different harbor environments by assessing harbor 
topography (e.g., basin volume, width of harbor mouth), tidal forces, distances to the target, 
and target seeking patterns against countermeasures based on literature and personal 
experience.  
1. Alexandria Harbor Attacks 
There were two sub-surface attacks against Alexandria harbor during WWII: one 
was successful and the other failed. The successful attack occurred on December 19, 1941, 
when Italian Special Forces frogmen successfully penetrated the harbor defenses of 
Alexandria harbor in Egypt.43 
 
 
43 Vincent P. O’Hara and Enrico Cernuschi, “Frogmen against a Fleet: The Italian Attack on 
Alexandria 18/19 December 1941,” Naval War College Review 68, no. 3 (2015): 20. 
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Material and equipment acquisition and preparation was at their highest level for 
the attack. The saboteurs were selected and trained from the nationally ranked swimming 
athletes in Italy. This Italian commando unit, Decima MAS, trained for over a year to 
exploit the sub-surface domain.44 Italy had relatively superior diving equipment such as 
the secretly developed DPV called “siluro a lenta corsa” (SCL). Colloquially known as 
“pigs,” the SCL was a slow-speed, neutrally buoyant, battery-powered human torpedo that 
could carry 300 kg of explosives, and it could be handled by two divers at a speed of 
2.5 mph (2.17 knots) with an operating range of 15 miles (13 Nautical miles, NM).45 The 
SCL had a magnetic compass and depth gauge for underwater navigation.46 Italian divers 
used closed-circuit rebreathers that lasted up to six hours underwater.47 This training and 
these resources were significant advantages in the sub-surface domain. 
Alexandria harbor is a small harbor, 5 km long and 1.5 km wide. It has 
approximately 0.2 NM of harbor mouth and a maximum depth of approximately 27 meters 
at the center.48 Tidal swing is approximately 0.5 to 0.6 meters,49 which is minimal. Due 
to the harbor’s moderate basin volume and comparatively wide open-harbor mouth, as 
shown in Figure 3, the tidal flow effect would be expected to be minimal. Nonetheless, 
divers operating in the harbor mouth area were susceptible to considerable sub-surface 
domain dynamics. 
 
44 McRaven, Spec Ops, 78. 
45 McRaven, 79,105; Andrew Knighton, “Manned Torpedoes and Massive Ships - The Alexandria 
Raid Of WW2,” War History Online (blog), October 29, 2017, https://www.warhistoryonline.com/world-
war-ii/manned-torpedoes-and-massive-ships-the-alexandria-raid-of-ww2.html. 
46 McRaven, Spec Ops, 79. 
47 McRaven, 80. 
48 “I-Boating : Free Marine Navigation Charts & Fishing Maps,” accessed August 17, 2019, 
http://fishing-app.gpsnauticalcharts.com/i-boating-fishing-web-app/fishing-marine-charts-
navigation.html#14/6.9561/79.8482. 
49 Maged Hussein, Mohammed Tayel, and Zeinab Moursy, “General Pattern of Alexandria Western 




Figure 3. Alexandra harbor basin.50 
Divers reached the harbor undetected on the night of December 19, 1941, by 
submarine, as close as 1.3 miles to the harbor entrance to improve the divers’ chances of 
accomplishing the mission successfully. Thereafter, as per Figure 4, “pigs” were 
maneuvered through the harbor mouth with divers partially submerged, having only their 
heads above water.51 This minimized the target distance and required referencing ground 
features from the surface until the divers confirmed the target before they dived.52 
In these operations, divers using these DPVs carried out 230 kg limpet mine attacks 
on HMS Queen Elizabeth, HMS Valiant, the Norwegian tanker Sagona, and HMS Jarvish, 
which was secured alongside Sagona.53  
 
 
50 “I-Boating : Free Marine Navigation Charts & Fishing Maps.” 
51 McRaven, Spec Ops, 105. 
52 O’Hara and Cernuschi, “Frogmen against a Fleet: The Italian Attack on Alexandria 18/19 December 
1941.” 
53 Patrick K. O’Donnell, First SEALs: The Untold Story of the Forging of America’s Most Elite Unit 
(Boston, MA: Da Capo Press, 2014). 
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Figure 4. Target seeking phase of Italian frogmen.54 
Alexandria harbor was thought to be well protected against all impending attacks. 
The harbor was access-controlled using anti-submarine nets with layered defensive 
measures: mine fields, advanced observation lines, “Lobster pot” explosives, net barriers, 
and a line of detector cables.55 “Lobster pots” are a type of explosive device that creates 
sound waves underwater which are harmful when they travel through less dense body 
cavity spaces, such as the cranium and chest of a diver.56 In addition to these 
countermeasures, there was intelligence that the Italians possessed the underwater 
capabilities to conduct sub-surface attacks. Despite the countermeasures in place, however, 
the Italian divers still penetrated the harbor defenses.  
 
54 O’Hara and Cernuschi, 8. 
55 McRaven, Spec Ops, 76. 
56 Naval Sea Systems Command, U.S. Diving Manual, 2–7. 
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The post-incident analysis of the attack discussed various lapses in harbor defenses, 
including the lack of countermeasures in the harbor, the lack of adequate detection 
technology, and missed opportunities to thwart the attack.57 
With these weaknesses identified, countermeasures were enhanced and 
subsequently thwarted a similar attack by Italian frogmen on the night of May 14, 1942.58  
The countermeasures were focused on both surface and sub-surface domains, especially to 
delay saboteurs at the insertion phase. Harbor defenses adopted vigilance-based 
countermeasures including extensive use of search lights in addition to sub-surface 
countermeasures.59 
2. Santisima Trinidad Attack in Rio Santiago Shipyard, Ensenada, 
Argentina 
Argentinian guerilla Montoneros successfully sank the Argentinian Navy ship 
Santisima Trinidad by exploiting a sub-surface route in the Rio Santiago Shipyard the night 
of August 27, 1975.60 They managed to acquire the training and diving technology from 
the Italian 10th flotilla MAS61 to carry out this successful attack that sank a British type 
42 destroyer by placing a 170 kg mine under the ship’s hull.62  
Geographically, the shipyard is situated off of a narrow channel from the sea, as 
depicted in Figure 5. The tidal difference of the shipyard is around 1 meter.63 As shown in 
Figure 5, there is a harbor basin in this shipyard, but there was considerable tidal flow due 
to the tidal difference from water flowing in and out mainly through the channel to the sea.  
 
57 O’Hara and Cernuschi, “Frogmen against a Fleet: The Italian Attack on Alexandria 18/19 December 
1941,” 13. 
58 O’Hara and Cernuschi, “Frogmen against a Fleet: The Italian Attack on Alexandria 18/19 December 
1941.” 
59 O’Hara and Cernuschi. 
60 Herbert-Burns, Bateman, and Lehr, Lloyd’s MIU Handbook of Maritime Security, 62. 
61 West, Historical Dictionary of Naval Intelligence, 210. 
62 Herbert-Burns, Bateman, and Lehr, Lloyd’s MIU Handbook of Maritime Security, 62. 
63 United Kingdom. Hydrographic Office, “Select Port - EasyTide - on-Line Tidal Predictions from the 




Figure 5. Rio Santiago Shipyard, Ensenada, Argentina.64 
Although the exact approach route is not clear, it is known that the guerillas spent 
three and half hours navigating a collapsible camouflaged boat close to the target,65 
avoiding detection and compensating for domain dynamics. Saboteurs were close enough 
to hear the voices of sailors on duty onboard the ship before launching the sub-surface 
phase to attack the target ship.66 Also, there was no evidence of harbor defense 
countermeasures against this attack. 
3. Kankasanthurei Harbor Attacks 
The following four case studies are based on LTTE terrorists who managed to 
acquire scuba diving equipment and training to attack SLN fleet units in harbors. The LTTE 
suicide divers first attacked two vessels in Kankasanthurei harbor, situated in the northern 
peninsula, in 1994. Again in 1995, they destroyed two Fast Gun Boats (FGB) in 
Trincomalee harbor in the Eastern Province of Sri Lanka. Thereafter, LTTE divers 
 
64 “I-Boating : Free Marine Navigation Charts & Fishing Maps.” 
65 Herbert-Burns, Bateman, and Lehr, Lloyd’s MIU Handbook of Maritime Security, 62. 
66 Herbert-Burns, Bateman, and Lehr, 62. 
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conducted several attacks through 1996, having found underwater delivery of explosive 
devices a less detectable tactic than land or air attacks against existing security measures.67   
Initially, the saboteurs used open-circuit scuba equipment, but by 2009, at the end 
of civil war, they had managed to obtain closed-circuit scuba diving equipment. All the 
attacks used fiberglass materials in the underwater improvised explosive devices. The 
saboteurs mostly used swim fins to assist them in either pushing or pulling neutrally 
buoyant explosive devices. There was no evidence of DPV use. 
LTTE suicide divers carried out two successful night-time suicide sub-surface 
saboteur attacks in Kankasanthurei harbor on August 16, 1994, and July 16, 1995, sinking 
a SLN surveillance command tender, a ship, and a tug. Kankasanthurei harbor is located  
in the northern peninsula and features a breakwater extending to the sea, as shown in  
Figure 6. The depth profile is almost flat and averages seven meters. The harbor mouth is 
open, with a width of 660 meters. The tidal difference is less than one meter.68 In terms of 
sub-surface domain dynamics, the harbor’s wide opening and moderate basin volume 
produces minimal tidal flow effect on divers.  
 
67 Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka. Ministry of Defence, Humanitarian Operations. 




Figure 6. Kankasanthurei Harbor, Sri Lanka.69 
Post-incident analysis revealed that saboteurs entered the harbor environment via 
an adjacent no-man’s land from the west side, as shown in Figure 6. The distance that the 
saboteurs swam is approximately 0.51 NM (944 meters).70 Due to the fact that these were 
suicide attacks, little is known about the navigation and approach methods. It is assumed, 
however, that the saboteurs used a combination of surface swimming and 2D navigation 
with magnetic compasses, exploiting the benefits of a shallow harbor environment. Using 
these methods, the saboteurs were able to evade SLN countermeasures, including ground 




69 “I-Boating : Free Marine Navigation Charts & Fishing Maps.” 
70 “I-Boating : Free Marine Navigation Charts & Fishing Maps.” 
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4. Karainagar Pier Attack 
The LTTE also carried out a similar successful suicide diver attack against four 
coastal patrol craft berthed at Karimnagar Pier on the night of June 11, 1996.71 This pier 
is located on the northern island, Karainagar, in Sri Lanka and sheltered by the other islands 
from the sea as shown in Figure 7. The tidal difference here is less than one meter and the 
depth is less than three meters.72 Unlike the other harbors, there is no demarcated harbor 
basin to determine the tidal flow effect on the saboteur. In the Karainagar pier area, the 
sub-surface domain dynamics are less disturbed due to the sheltering provided by the other 
islands, and the fact that there is no harbor mouth results in minimal tidal flow effect. 
 
Figure 7. Karainagar pier, Sri Lanka.73  
 
 
71 Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka. Ministry of Defence, Humanitarian Operations. 
72 United Kingdom. Hydrographic Office, “Select Port - EasyTide - on-Line Tidal Predictions from the 
UKHO.” 
73 “I-Boating : Free Marine Navigation Charts & Fishing Maps.” 
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Using these advantages, it was suspected that LTTE saboteurs launched this sub-
surface attack from Kayts Island to conceal their water entry. The distance to the target 
from Kayts Island is approximately 0.40 NM (approximately 700 meters).74 
The LTTE saboteurs may have used a combination of surface swimming and 2D 
navigation with magnetic compasses to exploit the shallow depth and minimal tidal flow 
effect in evading the SLN harbor defense countermeasures, which included ground security 
and dinghy patrols 
5. Trincomalee Harbor Attacks 
The LTTE terrorists carried out three successful sub-surface attacks against SLN 
fleet units in Trincomalee Harbor. Two of these attacks were conducted against vessels 
berthed at navy piers in the Naval Dockyard at night on April 19, 1995, and on October 17, 
1995. The third attack was carried out on May 10, 2008, at the commercial Ashroff Jetty 
in Trincomalee inner harbor.75 
Trincomalee Harbor is one of the prominent natural harbors in the Indian Ocean 
situated on the eastern coast of Sri Lanka.76 The Naval Dockyard and its piers are located 
next to the Trincomalee inner harbor entrance as shown in Figure 8. The Trincomalee inner 
harbor basin volume is expansive, and the harbor mouth is deeper than 50 meters with an 
opening of approximately 500 meters.77 The average tidal difference in Trincomalee 
Harbor is less than a meter.78 
 
74 “I-Boating : Free Marine Navigation Charts & Fishing Maps.” 
75 Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka. Ministry of Defence, Humanitarian Operations. 
76 “Sri Lanka Navy - Trincomalee Harbor,” Global Security, accessed July 11, 2019, 
https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/sri-lanka/navy-trincomalee-harbor.htm. 
77 “I-Boating : Free Marine Navigation Charts & Fishing Maps.” 




Figure 8. Trincomalee inner harbor, Sri Lanka79 
The SLN suspects that the LTTE terrorists launched the Trincomalee harbor attacks 
from Sobar Island, as it is an area with hilly jungle terrain where the saboteurs could have 
hidden. Unlike the Kankasanthurei and Karainagar attacks, the sub-surface approach to 
Trincomalee Naval Dockyard from Sobar Island is challenging, requiring the saboteurs to 
cross the inner harbor mouth where tidal flow effect is significantly strong and 
approximately perpendicular to the swimmers’ course of approach as shown in Figure 9. 
The LTTE divers managed to cross the 0.4 NM (approximately 700 meters) 
channel. To do this undetected, they may have swum along the water’s surface under the 
cover of darkness, at the time of high or low tide, as 3D navigation would be challenging 
when crossing such a deep harbor mouth due to both sub-surface dynamics and physical 
and physiological constraints. The SLN harbor defenses were unable to prevent the attacks.  
 
79 “I-Boating : Free Marine Navigation Charts & Fishing Maps.” 
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Figure 9. Trincomalee inner harbor mouth.80 
The last successful sub-surface attack against an SLN fleet unit occurred in 
Trincomalee’s inner harbor in 2008, at Ashroff Jetty (Figure 8). By this time, one year prior 
to end the civil war, diving equipment and training was more readily available, and 
sympathizers assisted in covert insertion of the divers. Additionally, the inner harbor 
presented fewer sub-surface domain challenges, and there were weaker SLN harbor 
defenses at the commercial jetty. It is suspected that two LTTE divers managed to employ 
eight improvised limpet mines, each weighing 32 kg.81 
6. Failed Attack in Colombo Harbor 
An LTTE combined surface and sub-surface attack in Colombo Harbor failed on 
April 12, 1996, due to a delay in the surface approach and the harbor defense 
countermeasures in place. 
 
80 “I-Boating : Free Marine Navigation Charts & Fishing Maps.” 
81 Shamindra Ferdinando, “Sea Tigers Open New Front, with Suicide Attacks at Sea,” The Island, 
March 26, 2013, http://www.island.lk/index.php?page_cat=article-details&page=article-
details&code_title=75579. 
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Colombo Harbor is the main commercial harbor in Sri Lanka. It extends to the sea 
with an artificial breakwater that is 1.25 NM in length and 0.5 NM in width. The average 
depth of the harbor basin is 15 meters,82 as shown in Figure 10. The harbor has two 
entrances that are approximately 220 meters and 190 meters in width, respectively.83 The 
average tidal difference in Colombo Harbor is less than one meter.84  
 
Figure 10. Colombo Harbor, Sri Lanka.85 
The LTTE terrorists launched the attack from a location two miles north of the 
harbor because they could not find safe launching places closer to their targets as they had 
in Kankasanthurei, Karainagar, and Trincomalee harbors. This was due to the strengthened 
 
82 “I-Boating : Free Marine Navigation Charts & Fishing Maps.” 
83 “I-Boating : Free Marine Navigation Charts & Fishing Maps.” 
84 United Kingdom. Hydrographic Office, “Select Port - EasyTide - on-Line Tidal Predictions from the 
UKHO.” 
85 “I-Boating : Free Marine Navigation Charts & Fishing Maps.” 
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ground security in the Colombo Harbor environment. Therefore, diver insertion was 
enabled by surface craft transiting open water.  
The saboteurs could not, however, enter the harbor basin underwater as they had 
planned. There are three fundamental reasons that may have caused the attack to fail. First, 
the saboteurs were delayed in their nighttime approach and it was daybreak as they 
approached the harbor entrance. Second, the surface insertion was complicated by the outer 
harbor sea conditions and the countermeasures that were enforced around the outer harbor, 
such as boat patrols covering the harbor entrances. Third, the fact that the saboteurs were 
detected at the harbor entrance indicates that the negative tidal flow effect significantly 
affected their entry through the harbor’s opening.  
Also, by 1996, SLN harbor defense units were quite familiar with the enemy 
strategy and employed more sailors in both ground and surface craft, inside and outside the 
harbor, to maximize countermeasure effectiveness. Additionally, subsurface harbor 
entrances were monitored by sonars and hydrophones, and scare charges were used to deter 
saboteurs.  
B. CONCLUSION 
The case studies of Alexandria Harbor, Rio Santiago Shipyard, and the LTTE 
attacks in Kankasanthurei, Karainagar, Trincomalee, and Colombo harbors reveal that 
saboteurs generally endeavored to minimize their distance to the target by approaching on 
the surface under the cover of darkness. All successful terrorist sub-surface diver insertions 
happened less than 1,000 meters from the target. Their surface approaches to the harbor 
vicinities were through unsecured areas (land domain), by surface craft, or by submarine 
in the case of successful attack in Alexandria Harbor. Also, the saboteurs used reference 
navigation, either surface features or sea floor features, when they were independently 
operating at the final homing phase of attack.  
The LTTE attacks were successful against SLN piers in Trincomalee, 
Kankasanthurei, and Karainagar harbors. In each of these attacks, the terrorists took 
advantage of hiding sites in adjacent jungles, sympathetic members of the local population, 
and shore-based launching beaches that avoided open ocean swimming to the target. A 
39 
subsequent attack on Colombo Harbor on April 12, 1996, was unsuccessful due to the 
detection of the saboteurs.  
Harbor defense countermeasures, including surface vigilance, apparently delayed 
the swimmers sufficiently to result in failed attacks in Alexandria and Colombo harbors. 
Therefore, understanding the pattern of previous underwater saboteur attacks and sub-
surface domain dynamics in harbors (based on maritime charts and tide tables) are 
important for commanding officers planning countermeasures to protect their ships. 
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V. SYSTEM DYNAMICS MODELING FOR SUCCESSFUL 
ATTACK AGAINST COUNTERMEASURES  
System Dynamics (SD) modeling is computer-based simulation that allows 
decision makers to change their mental models through a deeper understanding of potential 
behavioral outcomes of a complex system that result from interwoven and largely nonlinear 
causal relationships.86 System dynamics is an integral calculus-based methodology that 
allows for the modeling of problematic behavior arising from the structure of an 
endogenous system. The success and failure of sub-surface saboteur attacks in a harbor 
environment depends upon both the saboteur’s capabilities and harbor defense capabilities, 
as represented in Figure 11. 
Figure 11. Reinforcing and balancing behavior of saboteur and  
harbor defense capabilities 
In the simplest terms for modeling purposes, a saboteur who approaches a target in 
the sub-surface domain must reduce the distance to zero to achieve success.  
Countermeasures can be modeled, however, as the means to retard this approach (by 
artificially increasing the distance and time to the target). Therefore, countermeasure 
effectiveness can be modeled as decreasing the rate of approach to the target. Based on that 
logic, system dynamics software (in this case, Stella by ISEE Systems) was used to model 
 





























the conditions in harbor environments. Countermeasure effectiveness was used as the main 
feedback mechanism in the system to prevent a diver from reaching the target, thereby 
resulting in a failed attack.   
A. LITERATURE REVIEW ON SYSTEM DYNAMICS 
SD was developed by Jay Forrester in the 1950s as a qualitative and quantitative 
approach to understanding the behavior of endogenous systems based upon their structure 
and the dynamics of their feedback mechanisms, delays, and often, non-linear 
relationships.87 Since then, SD modeling has been used in a variety of disciplines, such as 
engineering, manufacturing, economics, and social sciences, to enhance decision-makers’ 
understanding of systemic behavior in real-world systems.88 Through the use of user-
interface “flight control simulators,” SD modeling further serves as a decision support tool 
in understanding potential, nonlinear and behavioral outcomes of a system over time.”89 
Forrester developed a calculus-based methodology of analysis that focuses on a 
system’s structure: the accumulations, rates of change, delays, and feedback that result in 
the system’s behavior over time. In system dynamics, stocks represent the accumulation of 
tangible and intangible, but measurable units (e.g., material, dollars, information) and flows 
represent the stocks’ instantaneous rates of change in units per time. Mathematically, 
stocks represent integrations and flows represent differentials. Stocks are, then, state 
variables, because at any given time, they represent a snapshot of the system’s state (but 
not the rate at which it is changing). System behavior is based upon the endogenous 
structure of the system and the non-linear feedback mechanisms and delays that it 
represents. Potential resulting behavior can include exponential (or reinforcing) growth, 
goals seeking (or balancing) behavior, oscillation, overshoot, and collapse, among many 
 
87 Sterman, 4. 
88 Sterman, 5. 
89 Norman Wayne Porter, “The Value of System Dynamics Modeling in Policy Analytics and 
Planning,” in Policy Analytics, Modelling, and Informatics: Innovative Tools for Solving Complex Social 
Problems, ed. J Ramon Gil-Garcia, Theresa A. Pardo, and Luis F. Luna-Reyes, Public Administration and 
Information Technology (Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2018), 123–50, 
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-61762-6_6. 
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others. System dynamics is intended to model problematic behavior vis-a-vis an entire 
system. So bounding the model is an artificiality that seeks to strike a balance between 
overwhelming the decision maker with too much fidelity, thereby obscuring the underlying 
feedback mechanisms, or oversimplifying the model and missing critical system 
elements.90 
Causal Loop Diagrams (CLD) are frequently used in SD to capture the fundamental 
causal relationships that, through feedback in a closed loop, drive the behavior of a system 
or sub-system. The diagrams consist of independent and dependent variables, connected 
by directional arrows from the Independent Variable (IV) to the Dependent Variable (DV). 
Each link is labeled with a polarity symbol (either a “+” or a“-”) to indicate whether  
the relationship is positive or negative. A positive link means that the behavior between 
the IV and DV is reinforcing: as the IV increases or decreases, the DV increases or 
decreases beyond what it otherwise would have been. A negative link means that the 
behavior between the IV and DV is balancing: as the IV increases or decreases, the DV 
decreases or increases beyond what it otherwise would have been.91 By simply counting 
the number of negative links in a closed loop it is possible to determine whether the 
behavior of the loop is reinforcing or balancing: an odd number of negative links indicates 
the loop is balancing (and is labeled with a “B”). An even number of negative links, or 









Of note, CLDs are not quantitative in nature, and therefore the strength of any given 
tie or loop cannot be measured by the diagram alone. These relationships are then often 
modeled using SD modeling.93  
B. MODEL FIT TO SUB-SURFACE DOMAIN SABOTEUR ATTACKS 
SD software was used in this thesis to model saboteur attacks in the sub-surface 
domain and to evaluate countermeasure effectiveness.94 As modeled, successful attacks 
depend on the saboteur’s ability to reduce the distance to the target to zero within the time 
constraint of the diver’s breathing gas availability (modeled as 3.0 hours) depending on the 
depth profile and gas consumption correspond to the information in Figure 2 in Chapter II. 
Therefore, the primary stock of interest in the model is the distance to the target in meters. 
The rate at which that distance changes in meters per hour (approach to target) is the 
primary flow of interest. Distance to target is affected by ebbing tidal flow effect. The 
distance affected by the impact of tidal flow effects on the saboteur’s angle of approach, 
referred to as offset from the intended course to target, and the saboteur’s speed of approach 
together with flooding tidal flow effect is affected by the countermeasures employed. 
Beyond a certain delay that would exceed the diver’s endurance, the attempt would fail to 
reach the target in time. Figure 12 depicts these causal factors in a CLD.  
 
93 Porter. 
94 Jay W. Forrester, “Learning through System Dynamics as Preparation for the 21st Century,” System 
Dynamics Review 32, no. 3–4 (2016): 187–203, https://doi.org/10.1002/sdr.1571. 
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Figure 12. Causal loop diagram for sub-surface domain saboteur attack.95 
C. METHODOLOGY 
The SD model uses assumptions and case study data to simulate saboteur 
approaches in different tidal dynamics (representing domain dynamics in closed harbors). 
The distance to the target is initialized as 1,000 meters and the saboteur swimming speed 
is initialized at 1,574 meters per hour. The metrics of concern are distance to the target, 
rate of approach to target, time to target, offset, and countermeasure effectiveness in 
different tidal dynamics.  
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1. Assumption 1: Distance to the Target and Range of Ship’s 
Countermeasures 
The initial distance to the target is modeled to be 1,000 meters based on case study 
analysis of successful attacks. It is assumed that a ship’s commanding officer would need 
to implement countermeasures such as boat patrols, radars, thermal imaging cameras, and 
other sensors within these 1,000 meters.  
2. Assumption 2: Saboteur Speed 
The saboteur’s swimming speed is assumed to be 1,574 meters per hour, as per 
Figure 2 in Chapter II. A diver exerting moderate effort can swim at a speed of 0.85 knots 
underwater, which equals 1,574 meters per hour. The use of DPVs as speed augmenters 
was not modeled since it was assumed that operating them at close proximity to the target 
would increase the risk of detection.  
3. Assumption 3: Saboteur Swimming Angle 
The saboteur’s sub-surface swimming angle is a function of the swimming vector 
and the tidal flow effect vector. This angle is determined by the tidal flow effect on the 
swimming direction from the point of insertion.  
4. Assumption 4: Tidal Flow Effect 
Tidal flow effect on a saboteur is assumed as starting from zero and rising or falling 
up to one knot (1,852 meters per hour), depending on high tide or low tide. Generally, 
average underwater swimmers are unable to overcome one knot of flow against them. 
Therefore, maximum tidal flow effect has been restricted to one knot for this model. Since 
tidal flow changes from high tide to low tide, or vice-versa, approximately every six hours, 




5. Assumption 5: Attack Success and Failure
The distance and time to the target is the determinant of mission success. If a 
saboteur reaches the target within a distance of one meter and within three hours, it is 
counted as a successful attack. If the saboteur experiences a tidal offset of more than 100 
meters (approximately half the length of a ship) from the target or the intended course to 
the target, even if that distance is reached within three hours, it is counted as a failed 
attempt. 
6. System Dynamics Model
This SD model is intended to represent the bounded system associated with a sub-
surface saboteur attack on a ship in an enclosed harbor. This model provides the user an 
opportunity to change values of certain variables in order to simulate and evaluate varying 
conditions and countermeasure effectiveness in a harbor environment. Figure 13 shows the 
SD model and two graphs depicting the outcome of a model run. The Appendix of this 
thesis contains the equation for this model. 
a. Tidal Flow Effect
The TIDAL FLOW EFFECT in the model simulates three different tidal conditions: 
flooding tidal flow effect, ebbing tidal flow effect, and neutral tidal flow effect (when there 
is no tidal flow effect on a saboteur), as shown in Figure 14. Tidal phenomena in harbors 
start from zero at the low or high tide level and rise or fall to maximum/minimum level at 
the third hour. Tidal flow is zero at the sixth hour, when it comes to high or low tide level. 
In the model, the ebbing tidal flow effect is added to the DISTANCE TO TARGET stock 
and the flooding tidal effect is added to increase the SABOTEUR SPEED.  
The model allows the user to input varying tidal conditions. As an example, since 
sub-surface attack success was highly correlated to night-time attacks in the case studies, 
tidal prediction in a harbor during dark hours can be input by the user.  
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Figure 13. SD model representation of sub-surface saboteur attack 
Figure 14. Tidal flow effects representation 
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b. Distance to Target/ Ebbing Tidal Flow Effect/Approach to Target Stock 
and Flow diagram. 
The DISTANCE TO TARGET stock is initialized at 1,000 meters. The outflow 
APPROACH TO TARGET reduces the distance units of the stock while the inflow EBB 
TIDAL FLOW EFFECT increases the distance units of the stock. THE EBB TIDAL 
FLOW EFFECT that increases the DISTANCE TO TARGET is a cosine function of the 
saboteur’s SWIMMING ANGLE multiplied by the TIDAL FLOW EFFECT (in meters). 
Therefore, the model equation adds distance to the target when it is ebbing tide, as the 
distance to the target increases with the ebbing tidal flow. 
The outflow rate of APPROACH TO TARGET is a function of SABOTEUR 
SPEED (as affected by flooding tidal flow effect) minus the product of SABOTEUR 
SPEED multiplied by the percentage of COUNTERMEASURE EFFECTIVENESS. 
Again, the flooding tidal flow effect is the cosine function of the saboteur SWIMMING 
ANGLE and the TIDAL FLOW EFFECT in meters per hour that adds to SABOTEUR 
SPEED. Therefore, during flooding tidal conditions (flooding tidal flow effect input 
negatively as in Figure 14), flooding tidal flow effect adds to SABOTEUR SPEED, and 
the result is an increase in the SABOTEUR SPEED with flooding tidal flow effect  
c. Offset and Saboteur Swimming Angle 
Since the OFFSET is a distance in meters, it contributes to the OFFSET stock as a 
sine function of the saboteur SWIMMING ANGLE with the TIDAL FLOW EFFECT.  
As per Figure 13, the FLOODING OFFSET and EBBING OFFSET inflows into 
the OFFSET stock use “IF, THEN, ELSE” logic to switch between different tidal 
conditions. The initial value for the offset stock is zero meters. The saboteur angle used to 
compute offset ranges from 0 to 90 degrees, input as radians (𝜋𝜋 −  𝜋𝜋/2) to find the SIN of 
the angle; as has been noted, an offset beyond 100 meters results in a failed attack.  
d. CounterMeasure Coverage Area 
The COUNTERMEASURE COVERAGE AREA is the semi-circular area that is a 
function of the COUNTERMEASURE RANGE squared, multiplied by PI and divided by 
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two. The ship’s sub-surface COUNTERMEASURE RANGE was modeled as 200 meters 
for this study.  
e. Saboteur Swimming Speed, Approach to Target, and Countermeasures 
The model always determines the APPROACH TO TARGET using the 
SABOTEUR SPEED and flooding tidal flow effect. SABOTEUR SPEED is retarded by 
the COUNTERMEASURE EFFECTIVENESS. The model uses 1,574 meters per hour as 
the baseline speed of approach.   
f. Successful and Failed Attack 
The logic used to determine successful or failed attack uses “IF, THEN, ELSE” 
statements with input from both the DISTANCE TO THE TARGET stock and the OFFSET 
stock. If the distance becomes less than one meter and time is less than three hours, it is a 
SUCCESSFUL ATTACK. If the OFFSET goes beyond 100 meters, or the time to reach 
the target is greater than three hours, it is a FAILED ATTACK.   
7. Modeling and Results 
 The SD model simulates various attack and countermeasure conditions.  
The model run time is six hours.  
a. Situation 1 
Case studies indicate saboteurs prefer using reference navigation to compensate for 
unfavorable tidal conditions/offset and to avoid detection. Saboteurs find these situations 
in shallow water harbors where there is no significant basin volume or harbor mouth open 
to the ocean. To represent this situation, tidal flow effect was set almost to zero. The result 
is shown in Figure 15. 
Accordingly, as Figure 15 shows, a flooding tide acting on a saboteur using 
reference navigation quickly reduces the distance to the target. A countermeasure 
effectiveness of at least 0.75 thwarts a successful attack. 
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Figure 15. Model result for flooding tide, reference navigation. 
b. Situation 2
A saboteur using 2D or 3D navigation seeks a flooding tidal flow with the least 
angle of tidal flow effect to the swimming vector. This would create a pushing tidal effect 
without offset. These situations are expected in harbors that experience significant tidal 
difference. The results of such a model simulation are shown in Figure 16. 
Accordingly, the saboteur who seeks direct advantage of flooding tidal effect 
reduces his or her distance and at least a 0.79 countermeasure effectiveness is necessary to 
prevent the attack. This is an ideal condition that in reality may be difficult to achieve. A 
radian angle of 0.0445 radians (approximately 2.5 degrees) between tidal flow effect and 
saboteur vector would offset the saboteur beyond 100 meters, resulting in a failed attack. 
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Figure 16. Model result for flooding tide, 2D/3D navigation. 
c. Situation 3
A saboteur who uses 2D or 3D navigation at the ebbing tidal flow with the least 
angle between tidal flow effect and swimming vector is then subjected to maximum 
negative flow against him. These situations are expected in harbors having significant tidal 
swing. The results of a model run in such a situation are shown in Figure 17. 
Figure 17. Model result for ebbing tide, 2D/3D navigation. 
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Accordingly, in the ebbing tidal situations, 0.32 countermeasure effectiveness is 
sufficient to prevent a saboteur from reaching the target. Furthermore, in this situation with 
a saboteur angle of 0.0445 radians (approximately 2.5 degrees) the attack would also fail 
due to offset.  
8. Model Findings 
Based on the assumptions used and system dynamics modeling, at least 79% 
countermeasure effectiveness must be maintained to protect a naval fleet unit at harbor at 
any given time to thwart all the impending sub-surface saboteur approaches in harbor 
situations. That said, if an underwater saboteur’s swimming angle to the target goes beyond 
0.445 radians (2.5 degrees), unless he or she surfaces to correct the approach. During an 
ebbing tide, countermeasure effectiveness would only need to be 32% effective to thwart 
a successful attack.  
D. CONCLUSION 
As demonstrated by the system dynamics modeling, sub-surface saboteur attack 
success or failure in a pier-side harbor environment is affected by a number of operational 
phenomena—both from the saboteur’s perspective and from the countermeasures 
perspective. From the saboteur’s perspective, timely execution and proper launch location 
to take advantage of flooding tide are the most important considerations. From the 
countermeasures perspective this means that forcing saboteurs to launch from alternate, 
unfavorable locations and at unfavorable times significantly decreases the saboteur’s 
exploitation of the flooding tidal flow effect, thereby delaying or thwarting the attack. 
Additionally, saboteurs using 2D or 3D navigation will experience the most offset effect, 
thereby forcing them to surface for course corrections, which makes them more vulnerable 
to countermeasures. 
Depending on the tidal conditions, the model found that more than 78% 
countermeasure effectiveness may be necessary to thwart sub-surface saboteur attacks. 
Therefore, ships’ commanding officers should plan on employing a layered defense in 
close proximity to their ships, using some situational awareness about the saboteur’s 
approach.  
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Protecting a naval fleet unit in harbor remains a challenge, with terrorism adding a 
new dimension of threat today. Naval fleet units enter harbors seeking shelter during their 
routine replenishments, maintenance, and repairs, leaving the collective protection of their 
fleet formations. In this context, terrorists might sabotage a naval fleet unit in harbor by 
exploiting the sub-surface domain to avoid detection and reach the target. 
Terrorists planning sub-surface domain attacks have both capabilities and 
limitations. Terrorists are able to acquire diving equipment on the open market, recreational 
diver training through a large network of facilities, and specialized training in the sub-
surface domain, including explosives handling. They are limited, however, by physical and 
physiological constraints, domain dynamics in harbors, and underwater navigation and 
target-seeking methods. 
Terrorists increase their capacity to carry out a sub-surface domain attack through 
several steps. First, saboteurs prepare and train for sub-surface attacks through dive training 
and development, adapting to underwater endurance, and learning to navigate in the sub-
surface domain. Second, they can insert closer to the target using surface craft or a land-
based launching site that reduces the distance of approach. Third, they typically approach 
the target using sub-surface reference, either 2D or 3D navigation.  
Nevertheless, even well-prepared saboteurs must face the challenges of the harbor 
sub-surface domain dynamics. The sub-surface domain in harbors is highly dynamic due 
to tidal flow effect. How the tidal flow affects the saboteur is determined by the tidal 
difference of the harbor, basin volume, and harbor mouth area, as the tidal flow floods and 
ebbs to and from the harbor basin roughly every six hours. This dynamic behavior creates 
sub-surface challenges in the harbor environment. Yet, a saboteur who seeks the advantage 
of tidal flow effect may accelerate his or her approach if timed correctly, but this window 
of opportunity is very small. Therefore, timely execution of an attack is important for attack 
success; delaying the saboteur’s approach to the target may cause the attack to fail. 
Additionally, the angle between tidal flow effect and the saboteur’s swimming vector can 
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offset the saboteur from his or her course to the target. This forces the saboteur to surface 
to correct his or her course, which makes a diver vulnerable to detection by surface 
countermeasures.  
According to the case studies, the success of the attacks in Alexandria Harbor in 
Egypt, Rio Santiago Shipyard in Argentina, and Kankasanthurei, Karainagar, and 
Trincomalee harbors in Sri Lanka depended on the saboteurs’ safe insertion close to the 
target and minimal domain challenges. The second attempted attack by Italian frogmen on 
Alexandria Harbor failed due to the implementation of additional harbor defensive 
countermeasures, including surface countermeasures that delayed the saboteurs. Similarly, 
the LTTE saboteurs failed in their attack on Colombo Harbor as the delay in approach due 
to negative sub-surface dynamics both outside the harbor and at the harbor mouth 
effectively nullified the advantage the saboteurs hoped to exploit (both the domain 
dynamics and the cover of darkness). The case studies and the countermeasure analysis 
reveal that harbors must employ a combination of countermeasures to mitigate saboteur 
attacks. Although sonar is often the countermeasure of choice, relying on sonar alone 
compromises the ability to accurately and effectively detect, distinguish, and localize sub-
surface saboteurs. 
A closer examination of the Sri Lankan cases highlights the effectiveness of 
defense-in-depth concepts using intelligence operatives, patrol boats, radars, thermal 
imaging cameras, diver detection sonars, physical barriers, and scare charges against 
saboteurs in the harbor environment. The other important factor of SLN harbor defense 
success was an awareness of the sub-surface saboteur’s approach. Harbor defense units’ 
personnel were trained to detect both surface and sub-surface saboteurs, with special 
emphasis on detecting a surface swimmer. The SLN utilized navy divers to simulate the 
characteristics of saboteurs to help operators identify the surface swimmers by radar and 
thermal imaging cameras. It also enabled operators to identify sub-surface saboteurs using 
hydrophones, sonars, and the floater movement of entangled divers in fishing nets to 
optimize countermeasures against saboteurs in harbors.  
The SD modeling in this thesis simulated the sub-surface saboteur’s approach to 
determine the variables that lead to attack success or failure. The variables included 
57 
distance to target, offset distance, approach to target, sub-surface swimming speed, tidal 
condition, flooding tidal flow effect, ebbing tidal flow effect, swimming angle with tidal 
flow effect, countermeasure range, countermeasure coverage area, and countermeasure 
effectiveness. Countermeasure effectiveness was the main determinant to retard/delay the 
saboteur’s approach to the target. Three simulations of saboteur approaches modeled from 
the most to least favorable target-seeking approach revealed that at least approximately 
78% countermeasure effectiveness must be maintained to protect the naval fleet unit at 
piers in harbors. Also, 2.5 degrees of tidal flow effect acting against the saboteur’s 
swimming vector offsets the saboteur away from the desired direction, forcing the saboteur 
to surface for course corrections when using 2D or 3D navigation. The SD model illustrates 
how several harbor environments can act upon the saboteur and lead to either a successful 
or failed attack in the sub-surface domain. Understanding a sub-surface saboteur’s 
approach to target and the variables that affect that approach can improve a commanding 
officer’s situational awareness to implement effective countermeasures.  
A. COMMANDING OFFICER’S AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY TO 
MITIGATE SUB-SURFACE DOMAIN ATTACKS 
Situational awareness of the harbor’s dynamics is critical for developing an 
effective defense. A commanding officer can expect a certain amount of harbor security 
based on the harbor’s ISPS compliance level. State intelligence and military involvement 
in harbor security may further enhance the commanding officer’s assessment of threat. To 
maintain sub-surface domain awareness, commanding officers should refer to harbor charts 
and tide tables. The pier location in the harbor basin and its relative position in the harbor’s 
domain dynamics also needs to be considered to judge the direction of tidal flow effect and 
its potential to assist a saboteur.  
A commanding officer is responsible for his or her ship and the crew onboard while 
dedicated harbor defense units are responsible for securing the harbor. Actions to defend 
against saboteur divers, whether in the preparation or insertion phase, are the concerns of 
the harbor defense assets of that particular harbor.  
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When saboteurs bypass those defenses, they will attempt to exploit the sub-surface 
domain to approach the target ship. Although maintaining a situational awareness of the 
harbor is important, a ship’s commanding officer must secure the immediate perimeter 
around the ship using available organic countermeasure assets. 
Based on the findings from the case study analysis and the SD modeling, this thesis 
recommends that commanding officers implement the following countermeasures to 
detect, distinguish, localize, and neutralize sub-surface saboteurs at the ship’s near-pier 
perimeters: 
1. Demarcate a possible area of dominance, especially seaward and along the 
pier; 
2. Create a physical shield perimeter using fishing nets or similar netting with 
illuminable floaters; 
3. Use small boats to patrol the physical shield perimeter; 
4. Seek to detect surface swimmers using thermal imaging camera and search 
lights; 
5. Employ at least two portable diver-detection sonars at the fore and aft of the 
ship; and 
6. Seek to detect sub-surface saboteurs using two passive sonars or 
hydrophones on either side of the pier at extended distances where the ship 
is berthed.  
Operators must be trained on saboteurs’ tactics, techniques, and procedures, as well 





APPENDIX.  INITIAL VALUES AND EQUATIONS 
USED IN MODEL 
Distance to Target – 1000 
 
Offset – 0 
 
Swimming Angle - PI/180 
 
Counter-measure Range – 200 
 
Counter-measure Employed Effectiveness - 0 
 
Tidal Flow Effect – graphically input representing tidal condition 
 
Approach to Target - Saboteur_Speed-(Saboteur_Speed*”Counter-
measure_Effectiveness”) 
 
Saboteur Speed - IF Tidal_Flow_Effect<0 THEN (1574-
Tidal_Flow_Effect*COS(Swimming_Angle)) ELSE 1574 
 
Counter-measure Coverage Area - (“Counter-measure_Range”*”Counter-
measure_Range”*PI)/2 
 
Counter-measure Effectiveness - IF(Distance_to_Target< “Counter-
measure_Coverage_Area”) THEN “Counter-measure_Employed_Effectiveness” ELSE 0 
 
Ebb Tidal Flow Effect - IF Tidal_Flow_Effect>0 THEN 
(Tidal_Flow_Effect*COS(Swimming_Angle)) ELSE 0 
 
Ebbing Offset - IF Tidal_Flow_Effect >0 THEN 
(Tidal_Flow_Effect*SIN(Swimming_Angle)) ELSE 0 
 
Flooding Offset - IF Tidal_Flow_Effect<0 THEN (-
Tidal_Flow_Effect*SIN(Swimming_Angle)) ELSE 0 
 
Successful Attack - IF(Distance_to_Target<1) AND (TIME<3) THEN 1 ELSE 0 
 
Failed Attack - IF Offset>100 THEN 1 ELSE 0 
 
60 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK  
61 
LIST OF REFERENCES 
Aquaviews. “Scuba Certification Agencies.” Leisure Pro (blog), November 2, 2018. 
https://www.leisurepro.com/blog/scuba-guides/scuba-certification-agencies-padi-
naui-bsac-cmas-and-more/. 
Bateman, Sam. “Assessing the Threat of Maritime Terrorism: Issues for the Asia-Pacific 
Region.” Security Challenges 2, no. 3 (2006): 77–91. 
Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka. Ministry of Defence. Humanitarian 
Operations: Factual Analysis July 2006- May 2009. Colombo: Ministry of 
Defence, 2011. http://slembassyusa.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/08/Sri-Lankan-
Humanitarian-Operation-Factual-Analysis.pdf. 
Doyle, Jennie. “Best Sea Scooter Reviews - Consumer Reports.” Popular Reviews, 
September 11, 2019. https://popular.reviews/sea-scooter/. 
Ferdinando, Shamindra. “Sea Tigers Open New Front, with Suicide Attacks at Sea.” The 
Island, March 26, 2013. http://www.island.lk/index.php?page_cat=article-
details&page=article-details&code_title=75579. 
Forrester, Jay W. “Learning through System Dynamics as Preparation for the 21st 
Century.” System Dynamics Review 32, no. 3–4 (2016): 187–203. 
https://doi.org/10.1002/sdr.1571. 
Global Security. “Sri Lanka Navy - Trincomalee Harbor.” Accessed July 11, 2019. 
https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/sri-lanka/navy-trincomalee-
harbor.htm. 
GPS Nautical Charts. “I-Boating : Free Marine Navigation Charts & Fishing Maps.” 
Accessed August 17, 2019. http://fishing-app.gpsnauticalcharts.com/i-boating-
fishing-web-app/fishing-marine-charts-navigation.html#14/6.9561/79.8482. 
Herbert-Burns, Rupert, Sam Bateman, and Peter Lehr. Lloyd’s MIU Handbook of 
Maritime Security. Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press, 2008. 
Hussein, Maged, Mohammed Tayel, and Zeinab Moursy. “General Pattern of Alexandria 
Western Harbor Sea Level Changes.” Journal of King Abdulaziz University-
Marine Sciences 21, no. 2 (2010): 46–61. https://doi.org/10.4197/Mar.21-2.4. 
International Maritime Organization. Security Awareness Training for All Port Facility 
Personnel. London: IMO Publishing, 2011. 
62 
Knighton, Andrew. “Manned Torpedoes and Massive Ships - The Alexandria Raid of 
WW2.” War History Online (blog), October 29, 2017. 
https://www.warhistoryonline.com/world-war-ii/manned-torpedoes-and-massive-
ships-the-alexandria-raid-of-ww2.html. 
Lomax, Hal. The Commercial Diver’s Handbook: Surface-Supplied Diving, 
Decompression and Chamber Operations Field Guide. North Palm Beach, FL: 
Best Publishing Company, 2013. 
McCullough, Jay, ed. Ultimate Guide to U.S. Special Forces Skills, Tactics, and 
Techniques. New York: Skyhorse Publishing, 2011. 
McRaven, William H. Spec Ops: Case Studies in Special Operations Warfare: Theory 
and Practice. New York: Random House Publishing Group, 2009. 
Miles, Franklin B. Asymmetric Warfare: An Historical Perspective. Carlisle Barracks, 
PA: Army War College, 1999. https://apps.dtic.mil/docs/citations/ADA363836. 
Nance, Malcolm W. Terrorist Recognition Handbook. 2nd ed. Boca Raton, FL: CRC 
Press, 2008. http://www.crcnetbase.com/isbn/9781420071849. 
Naval Sea Systems Command. U.S. Diving Manual. 7 Rev. SS521-AG-PRO-010. 
Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2016. 
https://www.navsea.navy.mil/Portals/103/Documents/SUPSALV/Diving/US%20
DIVING%20MANUAL_REV7.pdf?ver=2017-01-11-102354-393. 
Navimate. “Navimate GPS for Divers.” Accessed November 8, 2019. 
https://www.navimate.com. 
O’Donnell, Patrick K. First SEALs: The Untold Story of the Forging of America’s Most 
Elite Unit. Boston, MA: Da Capo Press, 2014. 
O’Hara, Vincent P., and Enrico Cernuschi. “Frogmen against a Fleet: The Italian Attack 
on Alexandria 18/19 December 1941.” Naval War College Review 68, no. 3 
(2015): 1–19. 
PADI. “Technical Diving Course Offerings.” Accessed June 23, 2019. 
https://www.padi.com/technical-courses. 
Porter, Norman Wayne. “The Value of System Dynamics Modeling in Policy Analytics 
and Planning.” In Policy Analytics, Modelling, and Informatics: Innovative Tools 
for Solving Complex Social Problems, edited by J Ramon Gil-Garcia, Theresa A. 
Pardo, and Luis F. Luna-Reyes, 123–50. Public Administration and Information 
Technology. Cham, Switzerland: Springer International Publishing, 2018. 
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-61762-6_6. 
63 
Radu, Ovidiu, Georgică Slămnoiu, Liviu Zărnescu, and Liviu Coşereanu. Harbor 
Protection Against Terrorist Threats: Difficulties and Possible Solutions. 
Constanta, Romania: Naval Research Center, n.d. Accessed ????. 
https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a485049.pdf. 
Rosenberg, Matt. “Tides - What Creates Them and Determines Their Timing: The Sun 
and Moon Affect the Oceans Tides.” ThoughtCo, August 1, 2018. 
https://www.thoughtco.com/what-are-tides-1435357. 
Scuba Tutor. “Pressure & Diving.” Accessed August 13, 2019. http://www.scuba-
tutor.com/dive-physics/pressure/. 
Shark Marine Technologies Inc. “Navigator: Diver Held Sonar Imaging and Navigation 
System.” Accessed November 8, 2019. 
http://www.sharkmarine.com/products/diver-held-systems/navigator/. 
Shemella, Paul. Global Responses to Maritime Violence: Cooperation and Collective 
Action. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2016. 
Sterman, John. Business Dynamics: Systems Thinking and Modeling for a Complex 
World. Boston, MA: Irwin/McGraw-Hill, 2000. 
 “Underwater Navigator.” In Adventures in Diving, 263–86. Rancho Santa Margarita, 
CA: PADI. Accessed June 24, 2019. 
http://www.scubabrucediving.com/Scuba_Bruce_Diving_-
_Forms/PDF__Files/Navigator.pdf. 
United Kingdom. Hydrographic Office. “Select Port - EasyTide - on-Line Tidal 
Predictions from the UKHO.” Predict - Select port. Accessed July 9, 2019. 
http://www.ukho.gov.uk/easytide/EasyTide/SelectPort.aspx. 
Valpolini, Paolo. “Harbours Keeping Harm at Bay.” Armada International 35, no. 4 
(2011): 14–16,18,20. 
West, Nigel. Historical Dictionary of Naval Intelligence. Lanham, MD: Rowman & 
Littlefield, 2010. 
Zongxin Sun, Jiarong Zhang, Gang Qiao, Donghu Nie, Jialing Liao, and Songzuo Liu. 
“Experimental Study on Target Characters of Divers.” In Oceans - San Diego, 
2013, 1–5. MTS, 2013. https://doi.org/10.23919/OCEANS.2013.6741091. 
  
64 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK  
  
65 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
1. Defense Technical Information Center 
 Ft. Belvoir, Virginia 
 
2. Dudley Knox Library 
 Naval Postgraduate School 
 Monterey, California 
